Math 167 Ch 9 Review 1 (c) Janice Epstein

CHAPTER 9 – VOTING

<u>Plurality Method</u>: Each voter votes for one candidate. The candidate with the most votes is the winner.

<u>Majority Rule:</u> Each voter votes for one candidate. The candidate with the majority of the votes wins.

When there are *n* votes, the majority is
$$\frac{n}{2} + 1$$
 [*n* even] or $\frac{n+1}{2}$ [*n* odd]

<u>Borda Count</u>: Each voter ranks the n candidates with n points assigned to the first choice, n–1 to the second choice and so on. The candidate with the most points wins.

<u>Hare Method</u>: If there is no majority winner, then the candidate with the fewest number of first place votes is eliminated. The election is held again and if no majority winner is found, the candidate with the fewest first place votes is eliminated and the election held again. Repeat until a majority winner is found.

<u>Pairwise Comparison Method</u>: Each voter ranks the candidates. Each candidate is compared to each of the other candidates and the candidate who is preferred gets one point. The candidate with the most points wins.

<u>Tournament Method</u>: Compare the entire slate of candidates two at a time, in a pre-determined order. The candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and the winner goes on to compare with the third candidate. These pairwise comparisons continue until a winner is found.

<u>Approval Method</u>: Each voter votes for all the candidates they approve of. The candidate with the most votes wins.

Math 167 Ch 9 Review 2 (c) Janice Epstein

FAIRNESS CRITERIA:

- **Majority**: If a candidate receives a majority of the first place votes, then that candidate should be declared the winner.
- **Condorcet**: If a candidate is favored when compared one-on-one with every other candidate, then that candidate should be declared the winner.
- **Monotonicity**: A candidate who wins a first election and then gains additional support without losing any of the original support should also win a second election.
- Irrelevant Alternatives: If a candidate is declared the winner of an election and in a second election one or more of the candidates is removed, then the previous winner should still be declared the winner.

Note that there may be a tie. With two candidates and an even number of votes, it is possible that each received n/2 votes. The method to break the tie should be in place before the election!

Ways to break a tie:

Flip a coin

Use the number of first place votes.

Introduce a new voter [the Senate uses the VP].

Math 167 Ch 9 Review (c) Janice Epstein

A set of 9 voters had the following preference list for 4 candidates:

	ک رو	BC	BC	BC	C	C	C
Choices	ADCB	ABCD	BCDA	BCAD	CBDA	CDBA	DCBA
# votes	3	1	1	1	1	1	1

(a) Who is the majority winner? If there is no majority, find the plurality winner.

The st=4 1st place Chas 1+1=2 1st place? A is

Bhas 1+1=2 1st place Dhas 1 1st place of plur. where

(b) Find the Borda count winner. 4x4 + 0x3 + 1x2 + 1x4 = 222x4 + 2x3 + 2x2 + 3x1 = 21 $2x^{4} + 3x^{3} + 4x^{2} + 0x^{1} = 25$ WINS. $1x^{4} + 4x^{3} + 2x^{2} + 2x^{1} = 22$ \mathcal{D}

- Find the winner using the Hare method.

 Find the winner using the Hare method. (c) Find the winner using the Hare method. Flum B: Chas 5 1st place = wins
- (d) Find the winner using the tournament method in the order ABCD A VS B ; (3+1) VS (1+1+1+1+1) => B wins B vs C : (if ifi) vs (3+1+1+1) => C wns C VSD: (1+1+1+1) vs (3+1) => C wins
- A plurality winner may not som with other (e) Comment on your results voting methods

Math 167 Ch 9 Review (c) Janice Epstein 2n=17


Seventeen board members vote on four candidates, A, B, C, or D, for a new position on their board. Their preference schedules are shown below.

majority is 9

Choices	A <mark>₿Ø</mark> D	DAB@	Ø BDA
# votes	7	6	4

(a) Find the winner using the Hare method.

(b) Using the Hare method according to the preference schedules shown, what happens if A rejects the offer before the ranking?



(c) Comment on your results

Have method can violate the Innel, alt, fairners out.

Consider the following preference table:

Choices	ABC	BCA	CBA
# votes	3	2	2

Which candidate, if any, is the Condorcet winner?

A rs B: 3 rs
$$242=4 \Rightarrow$$
 B wins (1 pt to B)
A rs C: 3 rs $-2+2=4 \Rightarrow$ C wins (1 pt to C)
B rs C: 3+2 rs 2 => Bwins (1pt to B)

Math 167 Ch 9 Review

maj is 7 votes

(c) Janice Epstein

An election has 13 voters and their preferences are given in the table:

Choices	ABC	CBA	BCA	BAC
# votes	5	4	3	1

(a) Determine the winner using the Hare method.

18 pl: A has 5, Bhas 4, chas 4 => Elim B & C => A wins

(b) Determine the winner using the Hare method if the last voter changes

their preference from BAC to ABC.

ABC CBA BCA ABC only 31%.

Chas 7 1st place A has 6 1st place only 31%.

(c) Comment on your results.

Have method violates mono tinaty

Math 167 Ch 9 Review 6 (c) Janice Epstein

SAMPLE EXAM QUESTIONS FROM CHAPTER 9

1. Use the chart below to determine what kind of poker will be played if each player marks all the games he approves of and the approval method is used to determine the winner.

Game played is _____ Card Stud

	A	В	С	D	Е	F	G	Н	†
5 card draw	X		X	X					
5 card stud	X			X		X		X	,
7 card stud		X		X	X	X	X		
Texas hold 'em	X			X	X		X		
Omaha hold 'em			X						

2. Use the chart below to determine who which two people will be elected to represent a class of 45 students to meet with the professor.

	12	4	9	6	1	7	6
Jeanetta	X			X			X
Mittie		X	X	X			X
Wilton	X		X		X		X
Jamaal	X	X					
Yong		X	X			X	

People chosen are Willon and Mitte

Math 167 Ch 9 Review 7

3. Suppose that a nine-member committee needs to elect one of the four alternatives A, B, C, or D. Their preference schedule is shown below.

Choices	AB 🎾	В Й А Й -	O DAB	
# votes	4	3	2	

Hare method.

(c) Janice Epstein

(a) Who wins using the Borda count?

- (B) B (A) A
 - (C) C
- (D) D
- (E) No winner

A has
$$4x4 + 0x3 + 5x2 + 0x1 = 26$$

B has $3x4 + 4x3 + 0x2 + 2x1 = 26$
Chas $2x4 + 0x3 + 4x2 + 3x1 = 19$
Thus $0x4 + 5x3 + 0x2 + 4x1 = 19$

(b) Who wins if a tournament is <u>held</u> with the ordering AB

- (B) B (C) C (D) D (E) No winner

A vs B; (4+2) vs 3 A wins

Avs C; (4+3) vs 2 Awins

Dwins (64E) 24 (4) ; (3+2)

- (c) Who wins using the Hare method?

- (B) B (C) C (D) D
- (E) No winner

Math 167 Ch 9 Review (c) Janice Epstein

4. There are 4 voters for 3 candidates. Their preference schedule is shown below. May is 3 votes

Choices	ABC	₿ĆA	₿₽
# votes	2	1	1

(a) Determine the winner using the Hare method. A wnns Elem Bande

(b) Determine the winner using the Borda count.

A has
$$2x3 + 0x2 + 2x1 = 8 pto$$

B has $[x3 + 3x2 + 0x1 = 9 pto]$ Burns
Chas $1x3 + [x2 + 2x1 = 7]$

A has ½+½=1pf, Bhas>2+1=12pts, Chas >2pt-

(c) Determine the pairwise winner.

Determine the pairwise winner.

A vs B 2 vs 2
$$\Rightarrow$$
 ½ point each to A and B

A vs C 2 vs 2 \Rightarrow ½ pt each to A and C

B vs C 3 vs 1 \Rightarrow 1 pt to B


B wins

(d) Determine the winner with the Hare method if the voter who liked the order CBA changes to BCA.

Math 167 Ch 9 Review 9 (c) Janice Epstein

- 5. The results of an election are $N = 40 \implies My \approx 21$ (ABC) (ABC) (ABC) (CDBA) (DAC) 10 9 8 7 6
- (a) Who is the majority winner? If there is no majority winner, use the Hare method to determine the winner.

(E) No winner



(B) B (C) C (D) D

- (b) Who is the Borda count winner?
- A has 19x4 + 6x3 + 8x2 + 7x1 = 117B

 C

 D

 101
- (c) Who is the pairwise comparison winner?

(A) A (B) B (C) C (D) D (E) No winner

AUSB (
$$10+9+8+6$$
) $vs(7) \Rightarrow A$ wins

AVS C ($10+9+6$) $vs(8+7) \Rightarrow Awins$

AVS D ($10+9$) $Vs(8+7+6) \Rightarrow D$ wins


BUS C ($10+9$) $Vs(8+7+6) \Rightarrow C$ wins

BVS D ($10+9$) $Vs(8+7+6) \Rightarrow D$ wins

CVS D ($10+8+7$) $Vs(9+6) \Rightarrow C$ wins

Math 167 Ch 9 Review 10 (c) Janice Epstein

(d) Determine the winner in the following three tournaments. Note that ABCD means that A plays B and the winner advances to play C. The winner of that second contest plays D to determine the winner of the tournament.



(e) Comment on your results.